« 2026. № 5 (191)

The Ethnology Notebooks. 2026. № 5 (191), 1524—1532

UDK 94(495)”1081/1083″:355.40

DOI https://doi.org/10.15407/

• Received: 20.06.2026
• Accepted: 17.09.2026
• Published: ??.??.2026

BYZANTINE INTELLIGENCE IN THE CONFLICT WITH THE NORMANS, 1081—1083

POROKHNAVETS Volodymyr

• ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0009-0009-2960-1938
• PhD student, Department of Medieval History and Byzantine Studies,
• Ivan Franko National University of Lviv,
• 1, Universytetska str., 79000, Lviv, Ukraine,
• Contacts: e-mail: poroh2200@gmail.com

Abstract. The article examines the role of Byzantine intelligence in the conflict with the Normans in the Balkans during 1081—1083, focusing on intelligence activities before the battles of Dyrrhachium in 1081 and Larissa in 1083. It analyses the forces of both sides, their armaments, and military tactics. It describes the Byzantine use of the feigned retreat during the battle near Larissa. It also examines diplomatic efforts to recruit mercenaries, Emperor Alexios I Komnenos’ plans for conducting military operations, and the use of intelligence in military campaigns.

The relevance of the topic lies in the fact that Byzantine intelligence played a crucial role in containing Norman expansion in the Balkans and prevented the Byzantine army from suffering a crushing defeat. The purpose of the article is to analyse Byzantine intelligence activities during the conflict with the Normans in 1081—1083.

Research methods: comparative-historical method, critical collation of sources. Results. The article demonstrates that Byzantine intelligence enabled the Byzantine army to select strategically advantageous locations for battles, identify safe routes of movement, and determine the location of enemy camps. The findings suggest that the Byzantine defeat near Dyrrhachium in 1081 was not the result of flawed tactics or poor decisions by Emperor Alexios I Komnenos. Instead, the Norman Count Robert Guiscard outmaneuvered his opponents by obtaining intelligence about their plans, while during the battle itself the decisive mistake was made by the Varangian units, which pursued the enemy and broke formation. Byzantine tactical intelligence made it possible to survey the terrain and select favourable battlefields, while strategic intelligence enabled the empire to recruit new allies who had previously been enemies, encourage local populations to revolt against the Normans, and sow discord within the ranks of the enemy army.

Keywords: conflicts, military art, tactics, espionage, battle, army, intelligence, maneuver, cavalry, Byzantium.

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